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Most poor people in developing countries still live in rural areas and are primarily 
engaged in low productivity farming activities.  Thus pathways out of poverty are likely 
to be strongly connected to productivity increases in the rural economy, whether they are 
realized in farming, in rural non-farm enterprises or by rural-urban migration. We use  
cross-sectional data from the Central Statistical Board for 1993 and 2002, as well as a 
panel data set from the Indonesia Family Life Survey for 1993 and 2000, to show which 
pathways out of poverty were most successful over this period. Our findings suggest that 
increased engagement of farmers in rural non-farm enterprises is an important route out 
of rural poverty, but that most of the rural agricultural poor that exit poverty still do so 
while remaining rural and agricultural.  Thus changes in agricultural prices, wages and 
productivity still play a critical role in moving people out of poverty. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the development community dedicated to meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), policy research has begun to focus on rigorous testing of 
models that explain MDG outcomes.  Most basic, of course, is the goal of reducing 
poverty and hunger by half.  Many “narrative” pathways out of poverty exist, but there 
are few quantitative models that have been tested over significant historical periods.  One 
reason for this shortage of empirical results is a simple lack of data.  Carefully tracing 
broadly representative pathways out of poverty requires long-term panel data on many 
individuals and households and are not available for many developing countries. 
However, the number of panel data sets is growing and empirical pathways out of 
poverty are now being described.  This paper reports on the pathways out of poverty in 
Indonesia during a period of economic and political turmoil.  Since most poor people live 
in rural areas, special attention is devoted to rural pathways out of poverty.  The generally 
positive results, even during this difficult period, hold broader promise for achievement 
of the MDGs. 
Most of the world’s poor live in rural areas and are primarily engaged in low 
productivity agricultural activities. Thus the main pathway out of poverty will be 
connected to increases in the productivity of the rural poor, whether these increases are 
realized in farming, in rural non-farm enterprises or by rural-urban migration. Indonesia 
provides an interesting case study for several reasons. First, between the late 1960s and 
the mid-1990s it experienced high and sustained economic growth, pulling millions of 
people out of poverty; second, it is large enough to display spatial and sectoral diversity, 
which are reflected in the large-scale household expenditure survey (SUSENAS) 
conducted regularly by the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS); and third, it has a large 
household panel dataset, the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), which allows a 
detailed investigation of the characteristics of households that move in and out of 
poverty. 
This paper draws on this Indonesian experience by using both cross-sectional data 
from SUSENAS and panel household survey data from IFLS to assess the importance of   3
changes in sector and location in driving changes in individual incomes and household 
poverty over time. The paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the conceptual 
framework and reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature; section 3 
describes the data, shows the aggregate picture of sectoral and locational movements in 
employment, and provides a decomposition of income growth and poverty transitions 
according to sector and location; section 4 analyzes the micro-determinants of income 
and poverty changes using the IFLS panel data, before concluding with implications for 
policy in the final section. 
  
2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Since the early works of Lewis (1954) one of the main questions in development 
economics has been the nature of the “structural transformation” that takes place as 
countries develop and how it influences growth and poverty reduction in the long term.  
Figure 1 presents a simple conceptual framework for how structural transformation 
translates into poverty reduction.  We use this framework to organize our review of the 
literature and our later empirical work.   
There are arguably two paths out of poverty.  First is the move from low to high 
productivity farming (Pathway 1).  This includes both intensification through raising 
productivity of traditional crops, as well as diversification into higher value crops, 
whether food or non-food. This pathway also includes those individuals who exit poverty 
by gaining better paid employment on higher productivity commercial farms. Thus 
staying in agriculture does not necessarily mean staying as a self-employed farmer. 
Second, some people exit poverty because of increases in the productivity and 
profitability of their non-farm enterprises, or by finding better-paid employment in such 
enterprises (often more formal) owned by others (Pathway 2).  This pathway applies to 
both rural and urban non-farm activities. 
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Complementing these two pathways, there are two “transition phases” which 
individuals may go through to reach the second route out of poverty. The first is a shift 
out of subsistence agriculture towards petty trading and manufacturing, as well as local 
non-tradable service provision (Transition Path A). This corresponds to the long-term 
sectoral shift from agriculture to non-agricultural activities as countries develop.   
Similarly, rural-urban migration, which can come both from households currently 
engaged in low-productivity agriculture and those currently engaged in petty trade, 
manufacturing and services, corresponds to the shift in location of economic activity seen 




Connecting the rural economy to poverty reduction: the general experience 
 
The most comprehensive literature on this broad topic has been on the role of 
agriculture in economic development and poverty reduction.  The basic linkages 
connecting agriculture to overall economic growth were first articulated to a general 
economics audience by Lewis (1954) and Johnston-Mellor (1961).  At a conceptual level, 
these linkages have long been part of the core of modern development theory and practice 
(Timmer, 1988; 2002; Tiffin and Irz, 2006). Establishing the empirical value of these 
linkages in different settings has been a cottage industry since the early 1970s (Byerlee, 
1973; Mellor and Lele, 1973; King and Byerlee, 1978; Hazell and Roell, 1983; 
Haggblade, Hammer and Hazell; 1991, Hazell and Haggblade, 1993; Timmer, 1997; 
Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly, 1998; Fan, Hazell and Thorat, 2000; Fan, Zhang and Zhang, 
2002; Fan, Thorat and Rao, 2004). Virtually all of these studies conclude that the 
“agriculture multiplier” is significantly greater than one, especially in relatively closed, 
“non-tradable” economies of the sort found in rural Africa, where the multiplier is often 
between 2 and 3.  But even in the more open economies of Asia, where border prices can 
be reasonably stable in the face of significant changes in domestic agricultural output, the 
agriculture multiplier is close to 2 in the early stages of agricultural modernization when 
productivity gains are the fastest. Because economic growth usually has a direct impact 
on poverty, any contribution agriculture makes to speeding overall economic growth   6
through these large multipliers will, in most circumstances, also directly contribute to 
reducing poverty (Dollar and Kraay, 2002; World Bank, 2004a). 
A related literature on the role of non-farm enterprises as engines of rural 
development, income growth, and poverty reduction has grown rapidly in the past decade 
(Mellor, 2000; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004; Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001; Datt and 
Ravallion 1998, Ravallion and Datt, 1996, 1998, 2002; Haggblade, Hazell and Reardon, 
2002). A key question addressed in this literature is whether non-farm enterprises are 
predominantly a low productivity supplementary activity which households undertake to 
diversify their income sources and insure against shocks to their agricultural income, 
which are important roles for the rural poor.  The more promising hope, however, is that 
rural non-farm enterprises are potentially a source of growth and poverty alleviation in 
rural areas. Most of the literature suggests that non-farm activities fulfil both important 
functions.   
These two literatures are bridged in a broader literature which attempts to 
understand the nature of pro-poor growth, which inevitably must encompass the rural 
poor and their potential pathways out of poverty (Ravallion 2004, World Bank, 2004a, 
2006b).  One theme of this literature argues that empirically, growth originating in the 
agricultural sector has tended to be more “pro-poor” than growth originating from the 
industrial or service sectors (Mellor, 1976; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and 
Chen, 2004; Timmer, 2002). Indeed, agricultural growth has often been an important 
ingredient in the formula that connects economic growth to the poor (Ravallion and 
Huppi, 1991; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Sumarto and 
Suryahadi, 2003; Fan, Zhang and Zhang, 2004; Fan, Thorat and Rao, 2004; Timmer, 
1997, 2004).  New agricultural technologies that improve farm productivity strengthen 
this connection.  Separate reviews by Thirtle, et al. (2003) and by Majid (2004) confirm 
the strong empirical link between higher agricultural productivity and poverty reduction.  
One explanation for why agricultural productivity gains stimulate more rapid and 
pro-poor economic growth than urban-based growth is provided by Mellor’s model of 
agricultural growth, rural employment and poverty reduction.  This model emphasizes the 
role of the rural non-tradable sector in pulling underemployed workers out of agriculture 
into the non-agricultural rural economy.  The Mellor model explicitly integrates   7
manufactured export performance (the source of much dynamism in East Asia’s 
economies since the 1960s) and the non-tradable sector in the rural economy (which 
includes a wide array of local agro-processing) to explain subsequent reductions in 
poverty.  This model, drawing on Mellor’s earlier work in India (Mellor, 1976) and more 
recently in Egypt (Mellor, 2000), explains why countries with substantial agricultural 
sectors that experienced rapid growth from labor-intensive manufactured exports had 
such good records of overall economic growth and poverty reduction.   
 
Connecting the rural economy to poverty reduction: the Asian experience 
Most of the four Asian country studies for the World Bank’s recent study of pro-
poor growth bear out the importance of agricultural growth for poverty reduction (Besley 
and Cord, 2006).  For example, the Indonesian case study (Timmer, 2006) argues that 
conscious policy stimulus to agriculture was the key to the country’s 30-year record of 
rapid, pro-poor growth (from 1967 to 1997), and that the model of smallholder 
agricultural development used by Indonesia is quite general.  The Indonesian model is 
explicitly set in the broader historical literature on the role of agriculture and economic 
development that has been generated by successful countries not burdened with highly 
skewed land distributions as a starting point for their development (Johnston and Mellor, 
1961; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, Timmer, 1988, 2002). 
However, the Bangladesh case study (B. Sen, Mujeri and Shahabuddin, 2006) and 
the Vietnam case study (Klump, 2006) each argue that agriculture played a large and 
crucial role in poverty reduction, but for highly idiosyncratic reasons based on unique 
initial conditions and domestic institutions.  Thus they argue that agriculture was 
important to pro-poor growth in both countries, but that the role cannot be generalized to 
other countries.   
In a separate study, Ravallion and Chen (2004) report that nearly all of the 
remarkable reduction in poverty in China between 1980 and 2001 was the result of 
agricultural growth specifically and diversified rural economic growth more broadly.   
They can find very little impact from growth in urban industrial and service sectors on 
reductions in the headcount poverty index (or the poverty gap or squared poverty gap).   8
However, not all studies find agriculture to be the dominant force in poverty 
reduction.  Controversially, the Indian case study by Besley, Burgess and Esteve-Volart 
(2006) argues on the basis of an enormously rich data set that agriculture has played a 
minimal role at best in India’s reduction of poverty, directly contradicting earlier findings 
by Ravallion and Datt (1996, 1998, 2002). These results are missing an important part of 
the historical story. The analysis by Smith and Urey (2002) of the relationship between 
agricultural growth and poverty reduction in India since 1950 shows very clearly the 
important investments and policy attention to reaching India’s rural poor through 
institutional and technical change in agriculture.  This policy attention before the Green 
Revolution established an environment in which the new technologies could have 
widespread impact on both the rural and urban poor.   
The second pathway out of poverty in Figure 1 is productivity growth in the non-
farm sector.  All four of the Asian country studies mentioned above as well as the 
Ravallion-Chen study of China, note that the rural non-farm economy has been (or in the 
case of Vietnam, could be) an important mechanism for connecting the poor to economic 
growth. The growing size and, in many countries, faster growth of the rural non-farm 
sector, implies that this may be a pathway out of poverty of growing importance in the 
future. However, this depends on the nature of the rural non-farm sector.   
Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) argue that rural non-farm enterprises are likely to 
be pro-poor, as they tend to use factors of production at their real opportunity costs to the 
economy, so they are often labor-intensive in nature, reducing underemployment, help 
smooth income seasonally and bid up local wages. Additionally, small and medium 
enterprises generate more employment per unit of capital than big firms; in general, 
wages in the non-farm sector are higher than in agriculture, so the low productivity 
residual activities do not seem to dominate this sector. Furthermore, they often produce 
low quality goods that are consumed by the poor, which benefit by obtaining local goods 
at lower prices, rather than expensive imports. The non-farm sector seems to be mostly 
inequality reducing, as it might be the only possibility for low-skilled workers to increase 
their incomes and to acquire non-agricultural skills from on-the-job experience.
4 
                                                 
4 See also the reviews of the rural non-farm sector in Bangladesh (World Bank, 2004b), Indonesia (World 
Bank, 2006a) and a multi-country synthesis (World Bank, 2006c).   9
The dichotomy in the literature about whether agriculture or non-agricultural 
growth has been most effective for poverty reduction reflects to some extent the lack of a 
multi-sectoral or general equilibrium approach to the issue.  For example, Larson and 
Mundlak (1997) show that across countries the pace of inter-sectoral labor migration is 
determined by the magnitude of the difference in average incomes in farm and non-farm 
sectors.  As labor leaves the agricultural sector, labor productivity in agriculture 
increases.  Thus the very process of structural transformation in which agriculture plays a 
smaller and smaller role is in itself responsible for raising incomes and reducing poverty 
within the agricultural sector (see also Timmer, 1988). 
Similarly, Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) model the rural economy as a three-
sector economy encompassing agriculture, non-farm non-tradable goods and services and 
non-farm tradable goods. Income growth is realized in two main ways: either by the 
increase in agricultural productivity due to technological change or by increasing urban 
or world demand for manufactured goods produced in rural areas. So both sources of 
productivity growth, agriculture and increased non-farm activities, can raise income and 
alleviate poverty. The main prediction of the model is that increased demand for 
manufactured goods can be the most pro-poor driver, as it both raises income and reduces 
local and spatial inequality. Empirically they also show, using panel data from India, 
those regions with the slowest growth in high yielding varieties of crops experienced the 
greatest increase in the rural non-farm tradable sector. This is because capital is mobile 
and seeks low wage opportunities in the agriculturally poorer regions. In other words, 
those rural areas which did not manage to raise incomes due to agricultural productivity 
increases found their productivity growth in the non-farm sector. This suggests that the 
natural and institutional factors that determine agricultural productivity growth also 
determine whether agriculture or the non-farm sector will be the principal pathways out 
of poverty. 
Datt and Ravallion (1998) report compatible results.  They confirm empirically 
that the main sources of poverty reduction in Indian states were agricultural productivity 
growth or divergence from the trend in non-farm output growth. But the initial 
endowment of human and physical infrastructure is found to be a crucial precondition for 
long-run impact on poverty reduction in India, as they can be seen as a prerequisite for   10
the success of non-farm enterprises. Their findings would suggest that a policy focus on 
agricultural productivity growth should alleviate poverty across the board as long as non-
farm enterprise constraints from infrastructure and human capital are mitigated. However, 
it might be harder to raise agricultural productivity growth in certain regions of the world 
than it is to alleviate the constraints facing non-farm enterprises.
5   
In summary, the literature suggests that agricultural growth has had an important 
role in poverty reduction in many countries.  However, with more open trade 
possibilities, low prices for staple cereals in world markets, and population growth 
slowing, the importance of agricultural growth for overall economic growth and poverty 
reduction is no longer so clear.  Furthermore, in most developing countries rural non-farm 
output now accounts for roughly half of rural income. Despite the fact that some non-
farm activity is surely of the low-productivity insurance type (and important to the poor 
for that reason), it is equally clear that the rural non-farm sector often enjoys greater 
potential for growth in income than the agricultural counterpart. This is especially true for 
rural regions that enjoy high levels of physical infrastructure and human capital, as such 
regions can reach higher productivity levels due to effective demand for their goods and 
services.  
Thus, whether the farm or the non-farm sector has been the most important 
pathway out of poverty is ultimately an empirical question, as is the relative importance 
of inter-sectoral transitions and rural-urban migration.  The answer for any given country 
depends both on its factor endowments as well as its policy and institutional history.  We 
therefore explore the empirical evidence about the pathways out of poverty for Indonesia 
over the last two decades.   
 
 
3. EVIDENCE ABOUT PATHWAYS OUT OF POVERTY 
 
To understand what have been the most important paths out of poverty it is 
necessary to know how many people there are in each of the cells of Figure 1, how many 
of them managed to move from one cell to the other, and by how much they improved 
                                                 
5 Several recent studies explore the difficulties of improving growth in the rural non-farm sector by 
improving the rural investment climate – see World Bank (2006a) on Indonesia, Deininger, Jin and Sur 
forthcoming on Sri Lanka, and World Bank (2006c) for a cross-country review of the evidence.   11
their welfare. Leaving aside the distinction between low and high productivity for the 
moment, Table 1 shows the numbers of people working in agriculture and outside of 
agriculture in both rural and urban areas in Indonesia. 
The aggregate evidence from SUSENAS suggests a steady movement out of 
agriculture over the last 20 years.  The share of workers in agriculture dropped from 54% 
in 1982 to 45% in 2002.  Moreover, the official data suggest an even more marked fall in 
the share of workers in rural non-agriculture; the major growth has been in the share of 
workers working outside agriculture in urban areas, which has more than doubled in 20 
years.  
 
Table 1. Employment in Agriculture and Non Agriculture, Indonesia 
 
   1982  1993  2002 
   N (000)  %  N (000)  %  N (000)  % 
                    
Agriculture 30,487  54.24  39,137  49.88  39,035  44.92 
Non Agriculture  25,724  45.76  39,329  50.12  47,874  55.08 
   Rural  15,939  28.36  18,992  24.20  16,785  19.31 
   Urban  9,785  17.41  20,337  25.92  31,088  35.77 
                    
All sector  56,211  100  78,466  100  86,909  100 
                    
Source: Susenas, 1982, 1993, 2002 
Note: exclude Aceh, Maluku, North Maluku and Papua. Employment is defined as self employed without help, self 
employed with help of householders/temporary workers, self employed with help of regular workers, employees and 
family workers with age 10 years and over (definition until 1997). Definition of employment since 1998 is the same as 
above, but persons 15 years and above. 
 
However, it is important to recognize that many areas which were rural in 1982 
and 1993, are now classified as urban.  This is because the definition of “urban” used by 
the Central Statistic Bureau relates to the number of amenities available in an 
administrative village, the population density and the share of income coming from 
agriculture.  All of these change over time, with the result that at least 10 percent of rural 
villages in 1993 had been reclassified as urban by 2002.  This is illustrated in Figure 2 
which shows the change in the share of employment in rural and urban areas and in 
agriculture and non-agricultural activities between 1993 and 2002.  The rural/urban 
classification in 1993 is used to determine rural/urban status thus avoiding confusion   12
Ag 
Ag 
between re-classification and migration.  Individuals were classified as poor or non-poor 
based on the per capita household expenditure of their households in the respective years.   
When the employment data are re-classified in this way, the share of the 
workforce employed in low-productivity agriculture (poor) dropped by 1.55 percentage 
points between 1993 and 2002.   Moreover, the change in the share of the workforce 
classified as urban and non-poor actually declines by 0.91 percentage points (instead of 
increasing by 9.88 percentage points in the official “published” data). 
 






























Note: The size of each rectangle is about proportionate to the numbers of workers employed in each category in 1993. There 
were 78.5 million workers employed in 1993 and 86.9 million in 2002. 
Source: Susenas 1993 and 2002. 
 
Moreover, the reclassified data suggest that the growth of the rural non-farm 
sector has been an important route out of poverty with an increase of 6.7 percent in the 
share of workers who are non-poor and working outside of agriculture in rural areas.  
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because it is the successful rural areas which are mostly likely to have become classified 
as urban during the course of the decade.   
To get a sense of the role played by true rural-urban migration rather than 
urbanization, Table 2 shows estimates obtained from the inter-censal survey (Supas) in 
1995.
6 Only 2.8 percent of those individuals in rural villages in 1990 were living in urban 
villages in 1995. Moreover, the 3.6 million people who moved to urban villages between 
these two years were compensated in part by 1.8 million people who moved from urban 
to rural villages over the same period. Overall, around 5 percent of those in urban areas in 
1995 had been living in rural areas five years previously. The role of “true” migration is 
certainly not trivial, but the much larger shifts in the shares of urban employment 
described above suggest that, overall, urbanization rather than rural-urban migration has 
been the dominant factor in changing the nature of activities undertaken by the poor and, 
therefore, their opportunities for finding a pathway out of poverty. 
 
Table 2: True Rural-Urban Migration, 1990-1995 
         1995    
      Rural Urban Total 
            
1990 Rural  122,037,729 3,570,511  125,608,240 
      97.16 2.84  100 
      98.53 5.13  64.91 
            
   Urban  1,823,701 66,089,601 67,913,302 
      2.69 97.31  100 
      1.47 94.87 35.09 
            
   Total  123,861,430 69,660,112  193,521,542 
      64 36  100 
      100  100  100 
Source: Supas (1995) 
 
While the above presents suggestive cross-sectional evidence about the numbers 
of people working in agriculture and non-agriculture in rural and urban areas in different 
years, these data do not show the numbers of people actually moving from agriculture to 
                                                 
6 “True” migration means that individuals actually physically moved from a village to somewhere else. 
Because the Supas survey asked about the respondent’s address five years ago at the village level, it is 
possible to tell whether they actually moved village or not. The full Census only asked for this information 
at the district level making it impossible to tell from Census data whether they moved from rural or urban 
areas.   14
non-agriculture. Thus, although these figures are suggestive about the pathways which 
may be the most important, they are not definitive--all that is shown is the net position 
rather than the actual flows themselves.  It is impossible to observe directly the number of 
workers shifting sector with existing data from SUSENAS (although panel data will be 
available starting from 2004.   
Furthermore, the lack of panel data does not allow us to identify the key 
characteristics that allowed individuals to increase their welfare by shifting sectors. In 
other words, the aggregate evidence tells us little about the micro-economic determinants, 
most notably education, location, etc., of sectoral employment shifts and implied welfare 




To explore the microeconomic determinants of exiting poverty requires a panel 
data set over a reasonable length of time.  Fortunately, the Indonesia Family Life Survey 
(IFLS) was first conducted in 1993 (IFLS1) and then again in 1997 (IFLS2), 1998 
(IFLS2+) and finally in 2000 (IFLS3).  For IFLS1, 7,224 households were interviewed 
with data collected on 22,000 individuals in those households. This sample is 
representative of about 83% of Indonesian population in 13 provinces. In 1993, IFLS did 
a face-to-face interview with the household head, the spouse, a sample of their children 
and a sample of other household members. In 1997, 94% of IFLS1 households were re-
interviewed consisting of all 1993 “main” respondents and all 1993 household members 
born before 1967.  In 2000, IFLS managed to re-contact 95.3% of IFLS1 households 
interviewed: all 1993 “main” respondents, all 1993 household members born before 1967 
and a sample of other 1993 household members. The sample size in 2000 was 10,400 
households and 39,000 individuals. 
The IFLS collects data at two levels.  First, information is collected at the 
individual and household levels.  This information consists of data on: consumption, 
income and assets; education, migration, and labor market outcomes; marriage, fertility 
and contraceptive use; health status, use of health care and health insurance; relationships 
among co resident and non co resident family members; processes underlying household   15
decision-making; transfers among family members and inter-generational mobility; and 
participation in community activities.  Secondly, the IFLS collects detailed information 
from the communities in which IFLS households are located including data on: physical 
and social environment, infrastructure, employment opportunities, food prices, access to 
health and educational facilities, and the quality and prices of services available at health 
and educational facilities.  Unfortunately, the 1997 data on sectoral employment and 
migration were not published – thus for our analysis we will use only data from 1993 and 
2000.   
Our main aim is to understand to what extent sectoral and locational shifts 
determine movements out of poverty.  For this reason, we restrict the panel used for our 
analysis to the individuals who were between the ages of 15 and 55 in 1993 and were 
working in both years.  For these individuals we have an estimate of their income
7, 
individual, household and community characteristics, as well as whether they shifted 
sector of employment and whether they moved location.  
There are two main caveats associated with our choice of sample. First, the 
sample used for analysis does not account for the unemployed or for newcomers to the 
labor market after 1993. Thus if a key pathway out of poverty is the entrance into the 
labor force of people who were out of the labor force in 1993, we will not capture this 
effect.  Similarly if individuals fall into poverty as a result of leaving the labor force (for 
example through death, illness or old age) this will not be observed.  If the aim of our 
study was to capture all poverty dynamics, these would be serious omissions.  However, 
our aim is to understand the extent to which changes in sector and location of existing 
workers drives poverty entrance and exits.  Moreover, evidence from other developing 
countries suggest that, although entrance and exits from the labor force can be important, 
it is usually changes in the income status of existing working household members that 
drives most poverty entrance or exit (McCulloch and Cao, 2007).   
                                                 
7 The IFLS collected data on individual income.  This is calculated as the sum of gross profit, net profit, 
and wages.  Combining these attributes too much income to individuals since, for some households, 
multiple members will contribute toward the profits from a household enterprise.  We therefore tested for 
the possible biases which this might impact.  In addition, calculations were done using individual income 
sources (wages, net profits, gross profits) to test the robustness of the results. The main findings were not 
altered substantially.  The results are available on request.   16
Second, we focus on the individual earnings of main household members. 
However, poverty is clearly a phenomenon that is experienced at the household level 
since, in most households, there is some pooling of resources. Thus, it is possible that the 
poverty transitions we observe may be due to changes in the incomes of household 
members that are not in our (or the IFLS) sample.  However, although the IFLS sample 
did not interview every member of the household, the method used means that it is likely 
to have captured almost all the significant sources of income in the household.  
Moreover, the vast majority of individuals in our sample are the sole or main income 
earner for their household, so changes in their earnings are likely to have a much larger 
impact on poverty transitions than changes in the earnings of other household members.  
In fact, the individual earning used for the analysis account on average for 70 and 67 
percent of their actual specific total household income in 1993 and 2000 respectively. 
The corresponding median is even higher at 74 and 77 percent. Thus, the individual 
earnings in our sample account on average for 70 percent of household income. With 




The poverty line used for all the analysis below is derived from the 2000 BPS 
poverty line.
8   For 1993 BPS also calculated a poverty line, but they used a methodology 
which is rather different than that used for the calculation of the 2000 poverty line.
9  To 
ensure that the poverty line in 1993 represents the same purchasing power as that in 2000, 
the easiest approach would be to take the 2000 poverty line and deflate it using the 
provincial consumer price index (CPI) published by BPS.  However, the published CPI 
uses a set of weights for its sub-indices which are heavily weighted in favor of wealthy 
consumers in urban areas.
10 This bias in the CPI is particularly inappropriate for our 
analysis.  In particular, since food prices rose more quickly than other prices over the 
period and the poor have a much higher share of their expenditure on food than the better 
                                                 
8 This uses a variant of the Bidani and Ravallion (1993) methodology for calculating poverty lines 
9 The BPS methodology for the calculation of the poverty line changed in 1996.  
10 For example, the CPI share on food is 38% but the food share of the bottom quintile from Susenas is 
66%. A detailed discussion of this general problem is to be found in Grimm and Günther (2006)   17
off, the published CPI understates the inflation experienced by the poor over this period.  
When this downward-biased CPI is used as a deflator, it produces a poverty line that is 
too high in 1993 and implausibly high measured levels of poverty.  For this reason we re-
weighted the individual commodity group indices from the CPI published for each 
province using the expenditure shares for each commodity group of the bottom quintile in 




Table 3 shows some of the key variables from the panel for 1993 and 2000.  For 
the individual variables, the average age of the panel obviously rose as did the years of 
schooling, indicating that some panel participants completed further schooling in the 
intervening years.  Interestingly, 62% of individuals worked in the non-farm sector, and 
this share did not change over the period.
11  The mean real individual income in the 
sample rose between 1993 and 2000 by 15.2%.  However, as is often the case with 
income data, the mean is distorted by high outliers--the median income is a little more 
than half mean income in both years--but it also grew by a similar amount, 16.4%, over 
the 7 year period.  Working hours remained roughly constant, whilst there was a small 
decline in the share of individuals who were employees.  It is important to remember that 
this 7 year period experienced considerable economic and political turmoil, and the 
economy had not recovered fully from the 1998 crisis when the 2000 interviews were 
held.  
In the household variables, a substantial increase occurred in the share of 
households classified as living in urban areas between the two years.  In 1993, 32% of 
respondents lived in urban areas.  In 2000, 40% lived in urban areas, a striking change in 
only 7 years that is even more remarkable after considering the “reverse migration” of 
several million urban workers during the economic crisis in 1998.  
 
 
                                                 
11 There were also significant changes in other sectors.  The share of respondents in manufacturing declined 
from 14.3% to 10.8%, whereas those working in social services rose from 13.6% to 19.6%.  These changes 
reflect the impact of the crisis and the growing informal service economy.   18




Mean in 1993  Median in 
1993 
Mean in 2000  Median in 2000
Individual Variables        
Age  37.3  37  45.2  45 
Years of Schooling  5.7  6  6.2  6 
Non-farm  0.62  1  0.62  1 
Real individual income   179,746  93,145  207,021  108,453 
Working hours per month  213.5  207.8  211.7  207.8 
Employee dummy  0.47  0  0.44  0 
        
Household Variables        
Urban  0.32  0  0.40  0 
Household Size  4.83  5  5.81  6 
Number of children < 5  0.70  1  0.47  0 
Number of children < 15  1.16  1  1.06  1 
Sex of household head  0.91  1  0.92  1 
Real household expenditure per 
capita   78,956  50,276  80,944  55,673 
Expenditure Poverty  0.28  0  0.24  0 
 
Note: Sample is individuals between the age of 15-55 in 1993 and earning income in 1993. All 
summary statistics calculated using individual probability weights for 1993 and 2000 respectively.  Real 
income and expenditure variables in 1996 Rupiah per month. 
 
Demographic changes are also clearly illustrated: the average household size 
increases by one over the period of the panel with a shift towards more adults in the 
typical household as the children grow up.  Households remain overwhelmingly male-
headed in both periods.  Interestingly and puzzling, the growth in individual incomes of 
the panel members is not reflected in similarly high growth in the expenditures of the 
households from which they come.  Mean real expenditure barely rose over the period, 
but what growth there was took place at the bottom end of the distribution, with the 
median per capita expenditure rising by 10.7%.  As a result of the steepness of the 
distribution near the poverty line, this relatively modest increase in expenditure resulted 




                                                 
12 Note that the 2000 figure is similar to the official poverty figure from BPS for 2000, but the 1993 figure 
is much higher.  This is because we are comparing “like with like” by expressing both the 2000 poverty line 
and the income figures in 1996 prices.  The official figure uses a poverty line with a completely different 
methodology, as noted earlier.   19
INCOME GROWTH 
With the IFLS panel it is possible to calculate directly the income growth for 
individuals who were working in particular sectors or regions.  Table 4 shows the median 
income growth for individuals according to whether they lived in rural or urban areas and 
whether they worked in agriculture or outside of agriculture for 1993 and 2000. Table 4 
shows an intriguing story of how income and income growth are associated with sectoral 
transition and rural-urban migration.  First, the dramatic impact of both urban location 
and work outside of agriculture is evident: agricultural workers earn about half the 
income of those working outside agriculture in both rural and urban areas; similarly rural 
workers (whether farm or non-farm) earn little more than half the income of workers in 
the same sector in urban areas. 
Next, consider how the typical worker in each group fared.  The vast majority of 
rural farm workers in 1993 continued to be rural farm workers in 2000 and saw their real 
incomes decline by 11%.  Almost all of those who moved out of farming in rural areas 
did so by moving to non-farm activities in rural areas; these individuals saw their real 
incomes rise by almost a third.  Very few rural agricultural workers moved to urban 
areas, so we do not place any confidence on the income growth figures for these 
transitions.  However, we note that real income fell by 7% between 1993 and 2000 for 
this poorest category of worker, with only those that shifted out of agriculture managing 
to increase their incomes significantly. 
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Note: Data are for individuals who were aged 15-55 in 1993 and were working in both years. Income figures are median monthly income in 
Rupiah in 1996 prices.  Starting income figures are for 1993; all other income figures are for 2000.  Income values and percentage changes in each 
cell represent the median incomes and percentage change in income of those individuals who made that transition. For example, the real income of 




        2000 
        Rural  Urban   
    
Starting 
income  #,Obs Farm 
# 
Obs  Nonfarm 
# 
Obs  Farm 
#, 




 Rural  Farm 48,470  1,590 40,660  1,268  78,519  274 22,305 31  107,177  17 44,868 
      -11.2%  31.1%  -56.4%  116.0%  -7.4% 
  Nonfarm  103,792  1,415 50,006  329  121,182 984  49,788  18 150,425  84 109,966 
1993       -37.4%   11.0%   -40.0%   -9.5%    5.9% 
 Urban  Farm 90,049  293  101,827  52  118,379 15 79,019  143  93,485  83 92,595 
      -15.4%   -22.2%   4.0%  8.8%    2.8% 
  Nonfarm  192,893  2,220  0  24  269,483 109  90,356 111 176,623  1,976 176,623 
      -100.0%   28.3%   -32.0%   -6.7%    -8.4% 
 All    95,904  5,518    1,673   1,382    303    2,160  107,875   21
Workers who were already working outside agriculture in rural areas in 1993 
were already much better off than their agricultural counterparts.  Around 70% of these 
workers stayed in the same sector, seeing their incomes rise by 11% over the period.  
However, more than a fifth of these workers fell back into the agricultural sector and 
experienced a sharp reduction in their real incomes as a result.  By contrast a small 
number managed to obtain non-farm work in urban areas.  In fact, these workers did not 
fare particularly well, as their incomes fell by 9.5%, but it is worth noting that those that 
managed to migrate to non-farm jobs in urban areas started out with incomes 60% higher 
than the median income for rural non-farm workers in 1993.  The handful of individuals 
who found work in the agricultural sector in urban areas saw their incomes collapse, but 
again we treat this result with caution given the very small number of individuals 
involved. 
Finally, the majority of the richest group, urban non-farm workers, stayed in this 
category and experienced a 7% fall in their real incomes, probably associated with the 
economic crisis of the late 1990s.  An unlucky 5% of this group shifted to urban 
agricultural activities and saw their income fall by 32%.  A further 5% shifted back into 
rural areas while staying in non-agricultural activities.  This group saw its income rise by 
28%
13.     
Overall, how should we interpret these results?  Three themes emerge.  First, for 
the poorest, who are mostly employed in rural agriculture, getting out of agriculture was 
key to increasing their incomes.  Only a handful of these individuals were able to migrate 
to urban areas, but almost a fifth left agriculture and in doing so substantially increased 
their incomes.  Conversely, for those that had already left agriculture, moving back into 
agriculture was a sign of distress; all shifts back into agriculture from non-agricultural 
employment were associated with major income collapses, an outcome consistent with 
the drastic impact of the economic crisis. 
Second, most of those who migrated to non-farm jobs in urban areas were already 
doing non-agricultural jobs in rural areas and tended to be among the better off non-farm 
                                                 
13 A handful of others shifted back into rural agriculture – by coincidence all of these individuals report 
zero income in 2000, but once again we interpret this result with caution given the small numbers involved.   22
rural workers.  But only 6% of rural non-farm workers managed to move to urban areas – 
whilst almost a quarter fell back into agriculture. 
Third, movements from urban non-farm employment to rural non-farm 
employment appear not to be associated with distress.  This suggests that these better off 
workers may move back to rural areas voluntarily for the purpose of investment in their 
home areas.   
 
POVERTY TRANSITIONS 
The income growth table shows what happened to incomes.  But income growth 
does not necessarily translate into movements in and out of poverty.  To evaluate these 
movements, Table 5 shows a detailed poverty transition matrix between 1993 and 2000, 
disaggregated by rural and urban as well as agricultural and non-agriculture.  The poverty 
of individuals is, of course, determined by the level of welfare of their whole households.  
We therefore determine the poverty status of individuals who were aged between 15 and 
55 in 1993 and were earning income by whether the per capita expenditure of their 
households fell above or below the poverty line. 
Although the IFLS data are not entirely representative of the Indonesian 
population, the 5308 workers tracked in Table 5 do represent basic Indonesian poverty 
patterns reasonably faithfully.  Rural poverty made up 74.9 percent of total poverty in 
1993 in the unweighted IFLS data, compared with 74.0 percent in the 1993 Susenas data.  
Analysis of how these 5308 workers fared between 1993 and 2000 should provide very 
useful insights into the dynamics of poverty in Indonesia.   23
 
Table 5:  Poverty Transition Matrix, 1993 to 2000, from IFLS Panel Data (raw numbers of individuals, not weighted) 
 
 
          2000 
         Poor Non  Poor   
         Rural Urban Rural Urban     










Agriculture    
Agriculture  713  276  41 4 3  307  68 8 6   
Rural  Non 
Agriculture  375 69 68  7 10 51  151  1 18   






Urban  Non 
Agriculture  296 0 2  16  132 0 4 8  134   
Agriculture  1,053 162  38  3  0 648 174  19  9    Rural 
Non 
Agriculture  1,389 61  117  0 23  238  864 17 69   















Urban  Non 
Agriculture  1,301 4 4 9  148  16  69  42  1009   
        Total  5,308 577 270  77 332  1,286  1,340 142  1,284   
                          
 
Note: Data are numbers of individuals in the category in 1993 who end up in the 2000 category.  The individuals are those who were aged 15-55 in 
1993 and were working. 
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Figure 3 shows some indication of the exquisite detail in the IFLS data.  Not only 
is it possible to replicate the net flows from, for example, “poor, rural, agriculture” to 
“non-poor, rural, agriculture” as in Figure 2, it is also possible to track the movements of 
the actual individuals who make up those flows.  The central panels in Figure 3 replicate 
the net flows in Figure 2, and tell reasonably consistent stories.  More of the action in the 
IFLS data comes from productivity gains in agriculture, with the rural, non-farm 
economy actually losing workers.  There is a modest gain in urban employment, although 
in net more of that gain is in urban agriculture than in non-agriculture, reflecting the 
impact of the economic crisis, which was still a major factor in 2000. 
The power of panel data is revealed by taking apart these net flows, interesting as 
they are, and tracking the individuals who come and go from each cell.  The IFLS data 
reveal astonishing mobility of individuals across cells.  The example picked in Figure 3, 
the cell representing workers who started and ended as poor, rural and agricultural, is 
especially revealing.  In net, 2.5 percent of the total sample of workers tracked left this 
cell between 1993 and 2000, exiting rural, agricultural poverty.  But only 276 of the 
original 713 workers in this category in 1993 remained there in 2000.  Another 301 
individuals joined them from other categories:  rural, agricultural but non-poor in 1993 
(162), rural, non-agricultural and poor in 1993 (69) and rural, non-agricultural and non-
poor (61).  According to Table 5 (showing actual numbers of individuals) and Figure 3 
(which shows the share of these individuals in the total of 5308 who are tracked between 
1993 and 2000), there are even 4 individuals who were urban, non-poor and non-
agricultural in 1993 who ended up as poor, rural and agricultural in 2000!  This particular 
number is small, but clearly the economic crisis fostered great mobility in the workforce.  
The mobility out of rural, agricultural poverty between 1993 and 2000 is just as 
striking.  Of the 713 workers who started in this category, 307 exited poverty by 
improving their agricultural productivity and 68 exited poverty by moving to the rural 
non-agricultural sector (41 remained poor after this move).  Only 21 poor rural farmers 
moved to urban areas.     25




  NP  5.78 1.28   0.15 0.11 
 
  P  5.20 0.77   0.08 0.06 
 
    Ag  Nag     Ag  Nag 
 
 
Where they went… 
[Percent (out of 5308 workers 
in total) of the 713 individuals 
who started as rural, poor  
agriculture] 
        U R B A N  
 
 
   RURAL    2.1->2.7  24.5->24.2 
                =  +0.6     = -0.3 
 
Non-   19.8->24.2  26.2->25.2 
Poor      = +4.4    = -1.0     1.3->1.5   5.6->6.3 
           =  +0.2     =  +0.7 
 
Poor    13.4->10.9   7.1->5.1       Agric.   Non-Ag 
      = -2.5     = -2.0 
 




  Where they came from… 
  [Percent (out of 5308 workers  
  in total) of the 577 individuals 
  who ended up as rural, poor 
 agriculture] 
 
    NP  3.05  1.15   0.06  0.08 
 
    P  5.20  1.30   0.04  0.00 
 
       Ag  Nag     Ag  Nag 
 
The central tables show the percent of the total IFLS workers who were tracked between 1993 and 2000 
(5308 in number).  In each cell, the first number is the percent in that cell in 1993, with the arrow pointing 
to the number in that cell in 2000.  The bottom number is then the net difference between 1993 and 2000, 
and thus this net number corresponds to similar numbers in Figure 2.  But these are only net flows, and 
Table 5 actually permits the identification of which workers made up that net flow and where they came 
from and went.  That is what the upper and lower cells show for just one of the net flows, for the rural, 
agricultural, poor.   26
Three key lessons emerge from this descriptive analysis of the IFLS data: 
1. Improved productivity in agriculture is still an important route out of poverty: 
Most of the rural agricultural poor in this sample who exit poverty do so while 
staying in rural agriculture, which is a sharp contrast with the SUSENAS results 
from the 1993-2002 analysis. Over 80% of the poor rural farmers in the sample 
were still working in rural agriculture in 2000, but more than half of the 
households from which they come still managed to exit from poverty. Most of the 
rest moved into non-agricultural activities in rural areas and, more often than not, 
out of poverty too. However, in agreement with the SUSENAS results, moving to 
urban areas was rare for this group – only 2.9 percent of those working as poor 
rural farmers in 1993 were working in urban areas in 2000.  Based on SUSENAS 
data, just 44.6 percent of employed individuals in 2002 were primarily engaged in 
agriculture, but 61.3 percent of the poor and 56.9 percent of the “near poor” 
worked in agriculture.  Raising agricultural productivity seems to be an effective 
way of reaching these households. 
2.Rural non-agricultural activities can be a stepping stone out of poverty in rural 
areas:  Individuals from poor rural households who worked off-farm in 1993 
were more mobile than those working in agriculture.  Less than a fifth stayed poor 
in rural non-agricultural activities—but overall they were equally likely to stay 
poor, as a similar number shifted back to agriculture while remaining poor.  More 
than half escaped poverty while staying in rural areas—a similar rate to those who 
started poor in agriculture. Urban migration played a more important role for this 
group, but still a minor one – less than 10% of this group moved to urban areas, 
and only half of those that did so exited poverty.
14  Still, this migration rate—
almost 10 percent of poor, rural non-farm workers migrated to urban areas in just 
7 years—is more than three times the rural-to-urban migration rate of poor farm 
workers (only 2.9 percent of poor farm workers moved to urban areas, and one-
third of those remained in poverty).  During the same period, 15.4 percent of poor, 
                                                 
14 Note that re-classifications are very rare (3.26%) in this panel so that almost all the rural-urban 
movements observed involve actual physical movement of the person. This adds weight to the evidence 
that urbanization rather than rural-urban migration is the principle form of rural-urban transition.   27
rural farmers moved to rural non-agricultural jobs and almost two-thirds of these 
exited poverty in the process.  The potential for the non-farm rural economy to be 
a stepping stone out of poverty is clear.  Here, the panel results add great 
emphasis to the SUSENAS-based analysis. 
3. Non-agricultural activities in urban areas may be somewhat more stable: As Table 
5 shows, 77.6 percent of the non-poor in this category remained non-poor, non-
agricultural and in urban areas.  At the same time, 44.6 percent of the urban non-
agricultural poor remained in that category.  Both rates of “stability” are the 
highest of the four categories. This stability may arise because earnings are much 
higher in urban areas, so the poor prefer to stay in the hope of a good job; or it 
may be difficult for poor urban workers to move or return to rural areas.  The 
distinction should not be overdrawn, however, as 61.5 percent of the rural, 
agricultural non-poor remained in this category and 62.2 percent of the rural, non-
agricultural non-poor had similar stability.  Indeed, when agricultural and non-
agricultural activities are combined, a common occurrence for households in rural 
areas, 78.0 percent of rural agricultural households and 79.3 percent of rural non-
agricultural households (in 1993) remained stably out of poverty.  Importantly, 
only the panel results can bring a clear picture of how much “churning” there is 
near the poverty line.  Clearly, there is a small but significant probability of 
falling below that line for rural workers, whether farm or non-farm. 
 
In summary, urbanization has been rapid, but only a small part is due to actual 
physical migration of workers and households.  In rural areas, there is a gradual 
diversification of economic activities taking place, characterized by greater reliance on 
non-farm sources of income.  This process of rural diversification reflects greater 
opportunities for growth in a dynamic non-farm economy than in agriculture per se, 
although increases in agricultural productivity have remained a very important path out of 
poverty, at least as judged from the panel data.  
These results are only a glimpse into the power of panel data. Many of the 
transition paths described above are strongly influenced by the individual characteristics   28
of workers, which are not considered above.  The following section explores the 
importance of these characteristics (as well as the characteristics of the families from 
which they come) on income growth and movements out of poverty.  
 
4. MICRO DETERMINANTS OF INCOME AND POVERTY TRANSITIONS 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF INCOME AND POVERTY LEVELS 
In order to identify the determinants of income mobility it is necessary to follow 
individuals and their earnings over time, which can only be accomplished using panel 
data. To start, we follow the common methodology and regress log real personal income 
using OLS on multiple explanatory variables to identify correlates of the level of real 
income in 1993 and 2000 respectively. Despite the well known methodological 
limitations of this approach, the OLS level regression is still a useful way of gaining a 
better understanding of factors affecting real income levels. Table 6 shows the results of 
log real income in 1993 and 2000 regressed on a combination of individual, household, 
geographic and employment characteristics.  We also run a Logit regression of the 
probability of being poor using the same explanatory variables as the OLS regression 
(Table 7). As mentioned above, our sample is restricted to individuals who were between 
15 and 55 in 1993 and earned an income; their poverty status is determined by whether 
the per capita expenditure of their households fell above or below the poverty line.  
Several variables are strongly associated with log real income. Real income 
increases with age but at a declining rate.  A person who was one year older in 1993 
received on average 9 percent more income and 10 percent in 2000 (due to the aging of 
the panel).  Male income is 44% higher than female income in 1993, even when age and 
education are taken into account.  This gap widens as the panel ages--younger women 
marry and have children, reducing their individual income. Years of schooling, as 
expected, have a strong effect with each additional year of schooling raising the level of 
real income by 8.7 percent in 1993. 
Household-level variables also have an impact.  Workers who were part of a 
household gain on average 7.3 percent more income in 1993 for each additional family    29
Table 6: The Determinants of Log Real Income in 1993 and 2000  
 
  1993 1993 2000 2000 
      
Age  0.096 0.092 0.103 0.098 
  (5.78)** (5.44)** (5.58)** (5.28)** 
Age  squared  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (5.47)** (5.22)** (5.85)** (5.61)** 
Sex  0.433 0.440 0.596 0.607 
  (11.14)** (10.83)** (15.58)** (15.22)** 
Working hours 
per month 
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (12.21)**  (12.16)**  (6.70)**  (6.87)** 
Wage income 
dummy 
0.145 0.137 -0.024  -0.050 
 (4.13)**  (3.50)**  (0.67)  (1.29) 
Years of 
schooling 
0.087 0.082 0.103 0.097 
  (20.27)** (17.64)** (25.71)** (22.13)** 
Household size   0.073  0.074  0.058  0.057 
  (4.86)** (4.94)** (4.52)** (4.50)** 
Number of 
Children < 5 
-0.094 -0.094 -0.064 -0.063 
 (3.70)**  (3.71)**  (2.25)*  (2.20)* 
Number of 
Children < 15 
-0.049 -0.048 -0.037 -0.036 
 (2.66)**  (2.59)**  (2.09)*  (2.01)* 
Number of Men 
in hh 
-0.043 -0.045 -0.038 -0.036 
  (2.29)* (2.39)* (2.09)* (1.99)* 
Urban  Dummy  0.248 0.251 0.055 0.068 
 (7.02)**  (7.14)**  (1.49)  (1.82) 
North  Sumatra  -0.204 -0.198 -0.124 -0.102 
 (2.79)**  (2.69)**  (1.67)  (1.36) 
West  Sumatra  -0.236 -0.240 -0.260 -0.259 
  (3.05)** (3.05)** (2.69)** (2.67)** 
South  Sumatra  -0.401 -0.414 -0.189 -0.184 
 (5.00)**  (5.11)**  (2.18)*  (2.09)* 
Lampung  -0.542 -0.538 -0.305 -0.297 
  (6.20)** (6.12)** (3.33)** (3.24)** 
West  Java  -0.307 -0.288 -0.060 -0.054 
 (5.17)**  (4.78)**  (0.96)  (0.85) 
Central  Java  -0.593 -0.578 -0.304 -0.276 
  (9.58)** (9.19)** (4.79)** (4.31)** 
Di  Yogyakarta  -0.700 -0.690 -0.472 -0.456 
  (9.83)** (9.78)** (6.21)** (6.01)** 
East  Java  -0.565 -0.554 -0.260 -0.244 
  (9.37)** (9.12)** (4.12)** (3.83)** 
Bali  -0.196 -0.208 -0.149 -0.162 
 (2.83)**  (2.98)**  (1.91)  (2.05)* 
West 
NusaTenggara 
-0.462 -0.462 -0.228 -0.220 
  (5.36)** (5.32)** (3.02)** (2.91)** 
South 
Kalimantan 
0.012 -0.006  -0.115  -0.126   30
  (0.16) (0.08) (1.32) (1.44) 
South  Sulawesi  -0.563 -0.560 -0.368 -0.371 
  (6.61)** (6.55)** (3.59)** (3.62)** 
Non-farm  dummy  0.562   0.264  
 (12.84)**    (5.78)**   
Mining_Quarry   0.830   0.535 
   (7.49)**   (3.64)** 
Manufacturing   0.416   0.104 
   (7.03)**   (1.59) 
Electricity   0.592   0.345 
   (4.80)**   (1.26) 
Construction   0.524   0.247 
   (7.77)**   (3.98)** 
Wholesale   0.600   0.269 
   (11.06)**   (4.93)** 
Transport   0.545   0.109 
   (8.57)**   (1.54) 
Finance   0.813   0.607 
   (5.63)**   (4.58)** 
Social_services   0.704   0.417 
   (11.80)**   (7.23)** 
Constant  8.071 8.178 8.096 8.235 
  (25.51)** (25.46)** (20.20)** (20.43)** 
Observations  5059 5059 4521 4521 
R-squared  0.39 0.40 0.32 0.32 
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%          31
Table 7: Cross-Sectional Poverty Logit Regression 
 
  1993 1993 2000 2000 
  Poor (based on household expenditure per capita) 
 
      
Age  -0.080 -0.077 -0.127 -0.126 
 (1.72)  (1.67)  (2.90)**  (2.84)** 
Age  squared  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.81)  (1.78)  (3.04)**  (2.99)** 
Sex  0.316 0.318 0.042 -0.114 
 (2.99)**  (2.87)**  (0.44)  (1.13) 
Working hours 
per month 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (3.89)** (3.67)** (2.84)** (3.10)** 
Wage income 
dummy 
0.220 0.183 0.262 0.181 
 (2.39)*  (1.73)  (2.92)**  (1.83) 
Years of 
schooling 
-0.170 -0.169 -0.190 -0.180 
  (12.64)** (12.09)** (17.19)** (15.52)** 
Household  size  0.202 0.201 0.248 0.254 
  (4.68)** (4.69)** (8.40)** (8.60)** 
Number of 
Children < 5 
0.380 0.383 0.220 0.211 
  (5.73)** (5.76)** (3.33)** (3.18)** 
Number of 
Children < 15 
0.000 -0.002  0.045 0.038 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.99) (0.84) 
Number of Men 
in hh 
-0.037 -0.035 0.001  -0.002 
  (0.78) (0.73) (0.03) (0.05) 
Urban  Dummy  0.289 0.288 0.580 0.596 
  (2.74)** (2.73)** (5.72)** (5.82)** 
North  Sumatra  0.948 0.928 0.236 0.155 
 (3.25)**  (3.18)**  (0.94)  (0.62) 
West Sumatra  -0.021  -0.047  0.768  0.674 
 (0.06)  (0.14)  (2.94)**  (2.57)* 
South  Sumatra  1.512 1.514 1.061 1.001 
  (5.07)** (5.04)** (4.17)** (3.93)** 
Lampung  1.736 1.702 1.010 0.954 
  (5.78)** (5.66)** (3.81)** (3.62)** 
West  Java  0.914 0.866 0.883 0.835 
  (3.34)** (3.17)** (4.13)** (3.91)** 
Central  Java  1.731 1.683 0.692 0.617 
  (6.45)** (6.27)** (3.18)** (2.83)** 
Di  Yogyakarta  2.063 2.021 1.256 1.147 
  (7.19)** (7.02)** (5.31)** (4.81)** 
East  Java  2.133 2.111 1.003 0.949 
  (7.94)** (7.85)** (4.61)** (4.39)** 
Bali  0.828 0.812 0.786 0.760 
  (2.80)** (2.74)** (3.24)** (3.12)** 
West 
NusaTenggara 
1.359 1.328 0.971 0.935 
  (4.61)** (4.50)** (4.10)** (3.96)** 
South  0.553 0.555 0.549 0.498   32
Kalimantan 
 (1.75)  (1.75)  (2.06)*  (1.87) 
South  Sulawesi  1.034 0.992 0.526 0.451 
 (3.36)**  (3.22)**  (1.99)*  (1.70) 
Non-farm  dummy  -0.641   -0.480  
  (6.28)**   (4.84)**  
Mining_Quarry   -1.660   0.160 
   (2.91)**   (0.42) 
Manufacturing   -0.392   -0.345 
   (2.63)**   (2.28)* 
Electricity   -0.774   -1.431 
   (1.51)   (1.40) 
Construction   -0.416   0.061 
   (2.00)*   (0.32) 
Wholesale   -0.740   -0.779 
   (5.50)**   (5.92)** 
Transport   -0.785   0.112 
   (3.94)**   (0.59) 
Finance   -0.840    
   (1.20)    
Social_services   -0.723   -0.805 
   (3.55)**   (5.27)** 
Constant -1.020  -1.085  0.201  0.330 
  (1.09) (1.17) (0.20) (0.33) 
Observations  5227 5227 5010 4980 
 
 
Robust z statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         33
member.
15 But having a larger number of children below the age of 5 seems to lower real 
income. The “number of children” effect cancels out the positive effect of household size, 
suggesting that any advantage of having a larger household is lost once one takes small 
children into account. Interestingly the number of men in a household affects average real 
income negatively.  Having more adult males living in the same household may be an 
indication of poverty (reflected in low individual income) even if their presence boosts 
household income. 
Geographical variables have an extremely strong impact on income.  Individuals 
in urban areas in 1993 earned on average 25 percent more than similar workers in rural 
areas
16, but this differential had fallen to 5.5 percent by 2000.  This is consistent with 
rural income growth being much faster than urban income growth over this period 
because of the economic crisis.  There are also wide variations between incomes in 
different provinces.  Relative to Jakarta, incomes are lower in all provinces with the most 
pronounced income gaps in 1993 occurring in Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi, Lampung, 
Central Java, and East Java. This changed dramatically in 2000 as Jakarta was badly hit 
by the crisis, reducing the income disparity between it and the other provinces. 
Economic and sectoral variables also have an influence. Deriving income 
predominantly from wages does appear to raise income slightly, but the effect turns 
negative and is not statistically significant in 2000.  Working more hours also increases 
income, but the effect is rather small.  By contrast there are large sectoral differences in 
income.  Working primarily in the non-farm sector boosts real income in 1993 by 56.2 
percent relative to agricultural activities, although this advantage declined to 26.4 percent 
in 2000. For specific sectors of employment there are large disparities relative to 
agriculture:  Finance (81%), Mining and Quarrying (83%), and Social Services (70%) 
display particularly large differentials.  These differences were substantially reduced 
between 1993 and 2000 due to the poor performance of many of these sectors relative to 
agriculture over this period.  
                                                 
15 This result is anomalous since usually larger households are associated with lower per capita incomes.  It 
may result from the attribution of all profit income earned by family labor to the main earner in the 
household. 
16 This difference is likely to be overstated since nominal income is deflated by provincial CPI, which is 
based on prices in the province’s main city.    34
The results from the Logit poverty regressions confirm and strengthen the OLS 
regression results. Even though we determine the poverty status of the individual by the 
per capita expenditure of the household rather than by their individual incomes, these two 
concepts are strongly linked, particularly when the sample is restricted to income earners. 
Hence, as expected, being older and more educated reduces the chance of being poor.  
Larger households now increase the probability of being poor as does the number of 
children below the age of five. Being male increases the probability of being poor for our 
sample.  This may be because the females in our sample are income earners and 
households in which the woman is also earning an income are likely to be better off than 
those in which only the male is earning. Interestingly, this positive probability 
disappeared in 2000, suggesting either that males managed to increase their earning 
situation considerably or that women lost out relatively more during the crisis. 
Surprisingly, living in an urban area increases the probability of being poor, and 
this effect increases over time.  Similarly, the probability of being poor is generally 
higher outside Jakarta, although this effect is reduced in 2000 due to the improving 
relative position of the provinces with respect to Jakarta.  Employment outside of 
agriculture reduces the probability of being poor, particularly in the 1993 sample. 
The level regressions above confirm many of the links expected from the 
literature between personal, household, sectoral and regional characteristics and level of 
income and poverty.  However, they do not tell us much about the dynamics of income 
and poverty.  For this we need to exploit the panel nature of the dataset to identify the 
determinants of income and poverty changes.  
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF INCOME AND POVERTY CHANGES 
To identify the determinants of income change we estimate a difference 
regression on both initial characteristics and changes in those characteristics.  In 
particular we are interested to see if a change from the farm to the non-farm sector has an 
important impact upon income growth.  In other words we estimate: 
 
ε β β β β
β β β β β
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
dSECTOR dGEOG dHHCHARS dINDCHARS
SECTOR GEOG HHCHARS INDCHARS y d
d d d d . . . .
. . . . ln
4 3 2
4 3 2 1 0
1
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where INDCHARS is a vector of individual characteristics, HHCHARS is a set of 
household characteristics, GEOG is a set of geographical variables, and SECTOR is a set 
of sectoral variables; ε is an error term and the prefix d indicates changes.  We are 
particularly interested in observing the size and sign of the dummies for changing sector.  
The results are shown in Table 8. 
As is common in the growth regression literature, the log of real initial income has 
a negative coefficient, implying conditional income convergence. In fact, the data also 
show strong absolute convergence (Table 9) of income implying declining income 
inequality.
17  Individuals who were older in 1993 tended to have higher growth rates, 
although the size of this effect declines with age.  Male workers also experienced much 
higher income growth than female workers, but those whose income came from wages 
experienced slower growth consistent with the impact of the crisis on formal wages.  
People with higher working hours in 1993 also experienced slightly lower income growth 
and the expansion of working hours is also associated with slower growth implying that it 
indicates stress rather than success. 
Individuals who were better educated in 1993 tended to have higher subsequent 
income growth (around 6% higher growth per extra year of schooling).  Households 
which were larger initially had faster income growth and growing households are also 
associated with higher income growth (although, of course, the causality here may run in 
the opposite direction).  Having a large number of younger children is not only associated 
with lower income, but also with slower growth, although, as would be expected, 
increases in the number of young children are positively (but not statistically 
significantly) associated with growth.  Having a larger number of men in the households 
is also associated with slower growth, although the effect is not statistically significant. 
                                                 
17 This is also consistent with the results obtained by Fields et al (2003) showing declining inequality for 
Indonesia between 1993 and 1997, as well as results reported in the World Bank’s Poverty Assessment for 
Indonesia (2006b).    36
Table 8: Income Difference Regression 1993-2000     
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  Change in log real income 
Log Real Income 1993  -0.623  -0.570  -0.632  -0.581 
 (23.32)** (17.92)** (23.64)**  (18.19)**
Age 0.043  0.043  0.040  0.040 
 (2.50)*  (2.48)*  (2.38)*  (2.37)* 
Age Squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
 (2.96)**  (2.94)**  (2.91)**  (2.90)** 
Sex 0.446  0.443  0.481  0.478 
 (9.85)**  (9.82)**  (10.19)**  (10.17)**
Working hours per month  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
 (7.44)**  (7.37)**  (7.31)**  (7.24)** 
Change in Working hours per 
month 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (5.98)**  (6.11)**  (6.08)**  (6.21)** 
Wage Income Dummy  -0.032  -0.028  -0.036  -0.032 
 (0.78)  (0.71)  (0.76)  (0.69) 
Years of schooling  0.064  0.064  0.057  0.057 
 (11.90)** (11.87)** (10.00)**  (9.99)** 
Household size   0.048  0.046  0.046  0.045 
 (3.22)**  (3.12)**  (3.13)**  (3.04)** 
Change in household size  0.036  0.039  0.033  0.036 
 (1.46)  (1.59)  (1.34)  (1.47) 
Number of Children < 5  -0.090  -0.088  -0.081  -0.079 
 (2.20)*  (2.16)*  (2.00)*  (1.96) 
Change in the number of 
children < 5 
0.051 0.049 0.042 0.040 
 (1.49)  (1.45)  (1.25)  (1.20) 
Number of Men in hh  -0.036  -0.035  -0.036  -0.036 
 (1.64)  (1.60)  (1.69)  (1.65) 
Change in Number of Men in 
hh 
-0.030 -0.033 -0.028 -0.031 
 (0.91)  (1.02)  (0.86)  (0.98) 
Urban Dummy  -0.052  -0.049  -0.043  -0.039 
 (1.30)  (1.20)  (1.06)  (0.97) 
North Sumatra  -0.167  -0.237  -0.157  -0.224 
 (1.87)  (2.58)**  (1.76)  (2.44)* 
West Sumatra  -0.185  -0.245  -0.195  -0.253 
 (1.59)  (2.09)*  (1.68)  (2.16)* 
South Sumatra  -0.062  -0.088  -0.042  -0.067 
 (0.65)  (0.91)  (0.42)  (0.68) 
Lampung -0.189  -0.285  -0.185  -0.275 
 (1.83)  (2.57)*  (1.80)  (2.49)* 
West Java  -0.001  -0.043  0.022  -0.019 
 (0.01)  (0.63)  (0.34)  (0.29) 
Central Java  -0.053  -0.090  -0.045  -0.081 
 (0.74)  (1.21)  (0.62)  (1.09) 
Di Yogyakarta  -0.239  -0.285  -0.225  -0.269 
 (2.69)**  (3.14)**  (2.52)*  (2.96)** 
East Java  -0.092  -0.136  -0.078  -0.120 
 (1.27)  (1.83)  (1.08)  (1.63) 
Bali -0.004  -0.060  -0.015  -0.069 
 (0.05)  (0.69)  (0.18)  (0.79) 
West NusaTenggara  -0.062  -0.097  -0.077  -0.110   37
 (0.68)  (1.04)  (0.84)  (1.20) 
South Kalimantan  -0.111  -0.146  -0.120  -0.153 
 (1.34)  (1.74)  (1.43)  (1.80) 
South Sulawesi  0.036  -0.010  0.022  -0.023 
 (0.33)  (0.09)  (0.20)  (0.20) 
Moved Province  -0.243  0.929  -0.263  0.869 
 (1.84)  (1.29)  (2.05)*  (1.22) 
Moved Kabupaten/Kota  0.136  0.100  0.133  0.062 
 (1.82)  (0.24)  (1.80)  (0.15) 
Moved Kecamatan  0.033  0.637  0.037  0.620 
 (0.75)  (2.36)*  (0.83)  (2.31)* 
Moved Prov x Initial Income    -0.181    -0.175 
   (1.69)    (1.64) 
Moved Kab x Initial Income    0.010    0.015 
   (0.16)    (0.25) 
Moved Kec x Initial Income    -0.097    -0.094 
   (2.31)*    (2.25)* 
Non-farm dummy  0.362  0.373     
 (1.99)*  (2.18)*     
Stayed Non-farm  -0.269  -0.282  -0.143  -0.155 
 (1.56)  (1.75)  (0.72)  (0.80) 
Moved to non-farm  0.082  0.077  0.082  0.077 
 (0.92)  (0.87)  (0.93)  (0.88) 
Moved to farm  -0.474  -0.499  -0.329  -0.352 
 (2.49)*  (2.76)**  (1.55)  (1.69) 
Mining_Quarry     -0.082  -0.067 
     (0.22)  (0.18) 
Manufacturing     0.132  0.143 
     (0.65)  (0.72) 
Electricity     0.126  0.144 
     (0.52)  (0.59) 
Construction     0.052  0.059 
     (0.25)  (0.29) 
Wholesale     0.292  0.302 
     (1.42)  (1.50) 
Transport     0.218  0.225 
     (1.04)  (1.10) 
Finance     0.535  0.527 
     (2.21)*  (2.20)* 
Social_services     0.450  0.455 
     (2.16)*  (2.21)* 
Constant 3.104  2.826  3.218  2.950 
 (8.71)**  (7.63)**  (9.07)**  (7.94)** 
Observations 4225  4225  4225  4225 
R-squared 0.32  0.33  0.33  0.34 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
Note: All variables which are not difference variables are from the IFLS 1993.   38
Table 9: Geographic and Absolute Convergence 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent 
variable 
Change in log real income 
North Sumatra  0.276  -0.037   
 (3.01)**  (0.46)   
West Sumatra  0.147  -0.102   
 (1.22)  (0.92)   
South Sumatra  0.467  0.019   
 (4.05)**  (0.19)   
Lampung 0.585  -0.046  
 (5.08)**  (0.45)   
West Java  0.308  -0.031   
 (4.09)**  (0.47)   
Central Java  0.467  -0.044   
 (6.40)**  (0.63)   
Di Yogyakarta  0.274  -0.178   
 (3.13)**  (2.05)*   
East Java  0.408  -0.053   
 (5.36)**  (0.71)   
Bali 0.360  0.027   
 (4.38)**  (0.35)   
West NusaTenggara  0.436  -0.066   
 (4.29)**  (0.74)   
South Kalimantan  0.108  -0.149   
 (1.17)  (1.78)   
South Sulawesi  0.649  0.111   
 (5.92)**  (1.08)   
Log Real Income 
1993 
 -0.423  -0.422 
   (18.63)**  (19.87)** 
Constant -0.225  2.824  2.782 
 (4.26)**  (16.70)**  (20.34)** 
Observations 4229  4229  4229 
R-squared 0.01  0.18  0.18 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       39
The geographical variables are not as important in explaining changes as they were in 
explaining levels.  Individuals in regions outside Jakarta show slower income growth, but 
the effect is only statistically significant in a few locations. Furthermore, the coefficients 
on the regional dummies only display regional-specific effects after controlling for all 
other variables, in particular initial income. Hence, they are in some sense a measure of 
our ignorance, as they display the regional variation unexplained by other elements in the 
model specification. This can be seen clearly in Table 9, which shows income growth 
regressed against only initial income and the regional dummies.  When growth is 
regressed against the regional dummies alone, it is clear that individuals living outside 
Jakarta generally experienced higher income growth than their counterparts in Jakarta. 
However, once we control for the initial level of income, all the coefficients on the 
regional dummies turn negative and many lose their significance as the income 
convergence is now captured in the initial income term.  
Table 8 also explores the implications of moving location (province, district, or 
sub-district) on income growth through the inclusion of movement variables.  The 
variables Moved Province, Moved Kabupaten, and Moved Kecamatan take the value one 
if the individual migrated to a different province, kabubaten or kecamatan over the given 
time period. The coefficients on these dummies are statistically insignificant in 
specifications (1) and (3). However, when we interact initial income with the migration 
dummies in specifications (2) and (4) we find that people who move relatively small 
distances (sub-district) tend to have stronger income growth, but only if they were 
initially less well off.  This supports the view that local level migration can support 
income mobility particularly for the poor. 
In order to analyze the impact of sectoral occupation on subsequent income 
change, a set of dummy variables was constructed to indicate whether an individual 
stayed in non-farm employment, moved to agriculture for those originally earning income 
in the non-farm sector in 1993, or moved into the non-farm sector, for those who where 
engaged in agriculture in 1993. The omitted variable was those individuals remaining in 
agriculture. Those who where engaged in non-farm activities in 1993 and stayed in the 
non-farm sector experienced higher than average income growth compared to individuals 
who remained in agriculture; their income growth was also significantly higher than that   40
of individuals who moved to the farming sector, which is clearly associated with income 
decline.  Interestingly, individuals who moved from agriculture to the non-farm sector 
seem to have experienced higher income growth than those remaining in agriculture, 
although the effect is not statistically significant.
18  This helps to explain the rapid growth 
of the non-farm sector described above. 
 
POVERTY DYNAMICS 
  The regression above tells us something about the determinants of income growth, 
but it tells us nothing specific about the dynamics of poverty. In order to determine what 
factors increase the likelihood of exiting or falling into poverty we run two Logit 
regressions: first we restrict the sample to people from poor households in 1993 and 
estimate the determinants of leaving poverty; second we restrict the sample to people 
from households whose per capita expenditure was above the poverty line in 1993 and 
look at the determinants of falling into poverty.
19 
Before turning to a more detailed model, Table 10 shows a simple Logit model 
which focuses on the transition paths described above, i.e. movement between rural and 
urban areas and movement in and out of agriculture.  Both regressions control for initial 
income.  Unsurprisingly, higher initial income increases the chances of exit and reduces 
the chances of falling into poverty.  However, staying in an urban area reduces the 
chances of exit and increases the chances of entering poverty, another indication of the 
predominantly urban impact of the crisis.  Neither transition to rural or urban areas is 
statistically significant.   
On the other hand, moving into the non-farm sector, or simply staying there, are 
significantly associated with exiting poverty and reduce the chances of entering poverty 
too relative to those who stayed in agriculture.  Thus the simple model gives some 
support to the importance of sectoral transitions in movements out of poverty. 
 
 
                                                 
18 This takes into account the fact that the median years of schooling equals 5 years for those who moved 
into the non-farm sector as compared to 3 years for those remaining in agriculture 
19 Of course this analysis can also be done simultaneously using a multinomial logit model, but the results 
would be almost identical.  We therefore prefer the more intuitive presentation of the two Logit models.   41
  Table 10: Simple Logit regression of poverty exit and entry (1993-2000) 
 (1)  (2) 
 exit  entry 
Log real income 1993  0.119  -0.352 
 (1.61)  (7.01)** 
Stay Urban  -0.768  0.317 
 (4.11)**  (2.28)* 
Move to Rural  0.760  -0.333 
 (1.44)  (0.80) 
Move to Urban  -0.280  0.395 
 (0.57)  (1.00) 
Stay Non-farm  0.537  -0.385 
 (2.86)**  (2.46)* 
Move to Non-farm  0.601  -0.336 
 (2.46)*  (1.47) 
Move to farm  -0.513  0.079 
 (1.90)  (0.37) 
Constant -0.536  0.619 
 (1.34)  (2.11)* 
Observations 1186  3690 
Robust z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
Table 11 shows how this assessment changes when the impact of individual, 
household and geographical characteristics on poverty exit and entry are taken into 
account.  Some of the determinants of income growth are not strongly associated with 
existing poverty.  For example, neither age, nor sex, nor working hours are significantly 
associated with exit from poverty.  The strongest effects come from education, which 
strongly increases the chances of exit and reduces those of entry, and from household 
size--large households are less likely to exit poverty and more likely to enter. 
The demographic composition of the household also matters for poverty entry, 
with higher numbers of small children and men making falling into poverty more likely.  
It is not clear why having more males in the household should be associated with a higher 
chance of entering poverty.  In most of the literature having more males is associated 
with higher rather than lower income, but multiple adult males in the household in this 
sample may reflect the impact of the crisis, as many urban construction workers returned 
to their village households, at least temporarily.     42
Table 11: Full Logit regression of poverty exit and entry (1993-2000) 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 exit  entry 
Log real income 1993  0.155  -0.295 
 (1.88)  (4.75)** 
Age 0.098  -0.128 
 (1.38)  (2.45)* 
Age squared  -0.001  0.002 
 (1.61)  (2.68)** 
Sex -0.056  0.088 
 (0.31)  (0.64) 
Working hours per month  0.001  -0.001 
 (0.81)  (0.79) 
Wage income dummy  -0.153  0.299 
 (0.95)  (2.30)* 
Years of schooling  0.132  -0.136 
 (5.03)**  (7.84)** 
Household size  -0.180  0.118 
 (3.03)**  (2.30)* 
Number of Children < 5  -0.004  0.196 
 (0.04)  (2.23)* 
Number of Men  0.044  0.191 
 (0.57)  (2.67)** 
Urban Dummy  -0.777  0.535 
 (4.13)**  (3.53)** 
North Sumatra  -0.938  -0.128 
 (1.29)  (0.34) 
West Sumatra  0.019  1.315 
 (0.02)  (3.68)** 
South Sumatra  -0.418  0.913 
 (0.58)  (2.63)** 
Lampung -0.954  0.471 
 (1.27)  (1.18) 
West Java  -0.322  0.818 
 (0.50)  (2.78)** 
Central Java  0.128  0.227 
 (0.20)  (0.70) 
Di Yogyakarta  -0.166  0.686 
 (0.24)  (1.94) 
East Java  0.428  0.850 
 (0.67)  (2.67)** 
Bali 0.158  0.672 
 (0.23)  (1.94) 
West NusaTenggara  0.277  1.311 
 (0.41)  (3.74)** 
South Kalimantan  -0.071  0.679 
 (0.10)  (1.98)* 
South Sulawesi  0.721  -0.028 
 (1.03)  (0.07) 
Moved Province  3.830  0.018 
 (3.40)**  (0.03) 
Moved Kabupaten  0.938  -0.203 
 (2.62)**  (0.94) 
Moved Kecamatan  -0.105  -0.024   43
 (0.58)  (0.16) 
Stayed Non-farm  0.262  -0.203 
 (1.29)  (1.19) 
Moved to non-farm  0.510  -0.331 
 (1.87)  (1.36) 
Moved to farm  -0.620  -0.054 
 (2.20)*  (0.24) 
Constant -1.908  1.176 
 (1.21)  (1.07) 
Observations 1185  3687 
 
 
  The economic characteristics of the individual also play a role.  Wage earners 
have a higher probability of entering poverty, probably as a consequence of formerly 
non-poor employees falling into poverty as a result of the crisis.  By contrast the initial 
level of working hours in 1993 has no significant influence on exit or entry. 
Geography as always is important, with people living outside of Jakarta often 
more likely to enter poverty or less likely to exit it (although the latter effect is always 
statistically insignificant).  Individuals from certain provinces (all of Java except central 
Java, South and West Sumatra, West Nusa Tenggara and South Kalimantan) appear to 
have been particularly vulnerable to poverty relative to those in Jakarta. The same was 
true of workers in urban households who, ceteris paribus, were less likely to exit poverty 
than their rural counterparts and more likely to enter.  
Moreover, moving either province or kabubaten appears to be positively 
associated with exiting poverty. Such movements are not associated with entering 
poverty, suggesting that geographical movements are associated with things getting better 
rather than with distress movement as a result of a shock. 
Finally, looking at the sectoral characteristics, it is interesting to note that moving 
to or staying in non-farm employment, which was strongly and significantly associated 
with poverty exit in Table 10, is no longer statistically significant.  Clearly, moving to 
and staying in the non-farm sector is correlated with other characteristics which 
themselves support exit from poverty.  By contrast, moving back into agriculture clearly 
and significantly reduces the chances of exiting poverty relative to those who stay in 
agriculture. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper started with a simple question--what were the pathways out of poverty 
in Indonesia between 1993 and 2000?  Two stylized pathways were put forward, 
improved productivity in agriculture and the growth of non-farm productivity; and two 
transitions to reach these paths were hypothesized, a sectoral transition from farm to non-
farm, and a geographical transition from rural to urban. 
The results presented above suggest that there is no single or simple answer to this 
question.  There are many factors which affect movements out of poverty.  The aggregate 
evidence from the SUSENAS data (when “corrected” for changing administrative 
borders) suggests that employment growth in the rural non-farm sector has played an 
important role in reducing poverty.  When carefully analyzed, these SUSENAS data offer 
useful insights into the net flows of workers across sectors and locations. But the use of 
cross-sectional data to understand poverty dynamics does not account for how individual, 
household and geographical characteristics may shape the transitions that occur. 
The IFLS panel data set allows us to explore precisely these transitions between 
1993 and 2000.  Among the poorest individuals who were aged 15+ and working in 1993, 
getting out of agriculture appears to be an important factor in increasing incomes.  
Almost a fifth of these individuals left agriculture and in doing so substantially increased 
their incomes.  This said, getting out of agriculture is not the only route out of poverty.  
Indeed over 80% of individuals from poor households working in rural agriculture in 
1993 were still working in rural agriculture seven years later, but more than half of the 
households from which they came managed to exit from poverty.  Thus boosting 
agricultural productivity is also an important pathway out of poverty.  
Rural-urban migration, by contrast, would appear to have a relatively small role, 
although this period in Indonesia’s modern economic history, from 1993 to 2000, was a 
particularly difficult one for successful rural to urban migration. Only a handful of those 
working in rural agriculture in 1993 were able to migrate to urban areas.  Most of those 
who migrated to non-farm jobs in urban areas were already doing non-agricultural jobs in 
rural areas and tended to be among the better off non-farm rural workers.  Thus it may be 
that the rural non-farm sector acts as a stepping stone between rural agricultural work and 
more productive non-farm employment in urban areas.   45
Even when the individual, household and geographical determinants of income 
and poverty are taken into account, our analysis yields broad support for the idea that 
movement to the non-farm sector increases income growth and makes exit from poverty 
more likely.  Understandably, somewhat less support is gathered for the importance of 
migration, although local level migration does appear to boost income growth, 
particularly for the poorest, while longer range district and provincial movements are 
associated with an increased chance of exiting poverty.   
However, it is clear that some key characteristics have a very significant influence 
on movements out of poverty.  Age, sex and education all have a strong influence on 
income growth, as, negatively, do certain elements of the demographic composition of 
the household, most notably the household size and the number of young children.  Poor 
schooling and large household size are also key barriers to exiting poverty, whereas a 
broader range of individual and demographic characteristics contribute to vulnerability. 
Geography matters.  The crisis hit people in urban areas harder than those in rural 
areas.  As a result our analysis shows that being in an urban area substantially reduces the 
probability of exiting poverty once controlling for other factors.  Similarly, once income 
convergence is taken into account, individuals outside Jakarta experienced slower income 
growth and a lower chance of exiting poverty than those in the capital. 
Our analysis suffers from one important drawback.  Because we are specifically 
interested in whether changes in the sector of employment are an important pathway out 
of poverty, we have had to restrict our panel to individuals who were aged 15 or over and 
working in 1993.  This, by definition, excludes the young and the unemployed.  It also 
excludes from our analysis new entrants into the panel in 2000.  Nonetheless, although 
this restriction will certainly impart a bias on the calculated levels of income and poverty 
relative to the full sample, our sample still provides a representative picture of the impact 
of sectoral and geographical changes on income growth and poverty transitions.   
What are the policy implications of these findings?  We suggest four.  First, 
notwithstanding the growing importance of the non-farm sector, it is still clear that the 
majority of the poor will remain in rural agricultural activities for some time to come.  
Our results suggest that boosting agricultural productivity is the principle pathway out of 
poverty.  It would therefore seem appropriate for the government to shift resources   46
towards actions which boost agricultural productivity.  These might include increased 
spending on agricultural research, improving the extension service, reducing costs by 
improving rural roads, and facilitating access to and use of more modern technology. 
Second, our results also highlight the key role played by the rural non-farm sector.  
This is an area which has been relatively neglected by policy.  Improving the investment 
climate for the rural non-farm sector will be key to broadening access to this stepping 
stone out of poverty (World Bank, 2006a).  Our results show that, all other things being 
equal, the provinces still display a growth disadvantage relative to Jakarta, suggesting the 
need for better market integration and infrastructure investment outside the capital. 
Similarly, broadening access to commercial credit for small businesses and improving 
access to marketing and technology will support the growth of this sector.  Also, more 
controversially, the government may wish to reconsider the current strong policy biases 
against the conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, as well as the 
price supports that discourage exit from agriculture.  These policies may be slowing 
down movement along a key pathway out of poverty. 
Third, our results point to a rather modest role for migration in poverty reduction, 
although this was not a typical period for testing this hypothesis.  There can be no doubt 
that urbanization is proceeding rapidly, particularly on Java, with the result that many 
formerly rural areas are now considered to be parts of urban economic space.  This 
process goes hand in hand with the shift towards a greater emphasis on non-farm 
activities.  Again the role of policy here should be to support and facilitate this change by 
ensuring that newly urbanized areas have access to the economic and social services 
needed to reduce urban poverty.   
Finally, our analysis reiterates the importance of education for exiting poverty.  
While sectoral change and migration have a role to play, improved education is still one 
of the most effective routes out of poverty, for two reasons.  First, better education 
enables people to participate in higher productivity activities.  Second, better education 
raises the probability of being able to make the sectoral and locational changes that give 
access to the other pathways out of poverty.  Ensuring that the poor have access to 
education, including post-primary education, should therefore be a cornerstone of the 
government’s anti-poverty strategy.   47
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